AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
All the scholars surveyed believe there are categories and processes of thought that are unique to Africa. African scholars also believe that the African way of organizing and cognitively engaging the world derives from a strongly restrictive indigenous sociocultural milieu, and that this approach to social life and the broader world has been negatively effected by Western cultural influences. Regrettably, however, the African scholars surveyed sometimes use what is normally regarded to be social scientific terminology in making reference to what they regard to be widespread African psychological and cultural characteristics, yet do not clearly define or qualify such usage. With the exception of Geyekye (1988), they also fail to clearly and consistently link their assertions and arguments to historical and ethnographic data. For example, political scientist and historian Ali A. Mazrui, in his most recent attempt to place Kiswahili language as a crucial element in East Africa’s political and economic development and ultimate regional integration, refers to the “East African mind” as follows:
“The psychology of living together is also undergoing a change – and Kiswahili is part of the new East African mind in communion with the modern world” (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995:134). Further, Mazrui’s collaborator and linguist, Alamin M. Mazrui, in a discussion of nationalism and the contributions of African Americans to Africa, states that “African Americans have made important philosophical and political contributions to the formation of movements like Negritude, pan-Africanism, and the African personality” (1995:161, emphasis mine).
Nyasani (1997) is no more reticent in his vaguely defined references to the “African mind” and its characteristics. He believes that “in the same way reference is made to the Greek or Roman civilization, it must be quite appropriate and legitimate to refer to a particular strand of mind that is quite peculiar to Africa and which shapes the prevailing conditions or permits itself to adapt to those conditions. … (T)here is a distinctive feature about the African mind which seems to support the claim that the mind in black Africa may not necessarily operate in the same strict pattern as minds elsewhere in the world…. (I)t is the way our mind functions and operates under certain conditions that we are able to arrogate to ourselves a peculiar status, social identification and geographical label” (1997:51-55, emphases mine).
According to Nyasani (1997:56-57), African, Asian and European minds are products of unique “cultural edifices” and “cultural streams” that arose from environmental conditioning and long-standing cultural traditions. Within the African cultural stream, Nyasani claims, are psychological and moral characteristics pertaining to African identity, personality and dignity. Makgoba (1997) goes further and argues that throughout the African Diaspora peoples of African descent:
“are linked by shared values that are fundamental features of African identify and culture. These, for example, include hospitality, friendliness, the consensus and common framework-seeking principle, ubuntu, and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual. These features typically underpin the variations of African culture and identity everywhere. The existence of African identity is not in doubt” (1997:197-198).
Regarding personality characteristics he believes to be inherent in the African mind, Nyasani identifies and discusses sociality, patience, tolerance, sympathy and acceptance as:
“areas in which the African mind seems to reveal itself in a somewhat dramatic way. It reveals itself through what may rightly be called a congenital trait of sociality or sociability. It further reveals itself as a virtuous natural endowment of patience and tolerance. And lastly it manifests itself as a natural disposition for mutual sympathy and acceptance. These three areas then appear to serve as important landmarks in the general description of the phenomenology of the African mind” (1997:57, emphases mine).
Caught in a social pyramid characterized by a one-way vertical authority structure and a two-way horizontal family and communal support system, the African mind, beset with superstition and destabilized by Western acculturation, is relatively unilinear, uncritical, lacking in initiative and therefore “encapsulated,” says Nyasani. This, Nyasani (1997) insists, has been extremely negative for Africa, especially in terms of the African individual’s creativity and ability to innovate:
(W)hat we experience in the practical life of an African is the apparent stagnation or stalemate in his social as well as economic evolution…. It is quite evident that the social consequences of this unfortunate social impasse (encapsulation) can be very grave especially where the process of acculturation and indeterminate enculturation is taking place at an uncontrollable pace.… By and large, it can safely be affirmed that social encapsulation in Africa works both positively and negatively. It is positive in as far as it guarantees a modicum of social cohesion, social harmony and social mutual concern. However, in as far as it does not promote fully the exercise of personal initiative and incentive, it can be regarded as negative (Nyasani 1997:130-131, emphases mine).
AFRICAN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The African scholars surveyed, with the possible exception of Ghanian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1988), regard African concepts of the individual and self to be almost totally dependent on and subordinate to social entities and cultural processes. Kenyan theology professor John S. Mbiti (1969 and 1992), for example, believes that the individual has little latitude for self determination outside the context of the traditional African family and community. He writes:
“Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.’ This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man” (1969:109).
For Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1988), the individual, although originating from and inextricably bound to his family and community, nevertheless possesses a clear concept of himself as a distinct person of volition. It is from this combined sense of personhood and communal membership that the family and community expect individuals to take personally enhancing and socially responsible decisions and actions. Although he accepts that the dominant entity of African social order is the community, Gyekye believes “it would be more correct to describe that order as amphibious, for it manifests features of both communality and individuality. … African social thought seeks to avoid the excesses of the two exaggerated systems, while allowing for a meaningful, albeit uneasy, interaction between the individual and the society” (1988:31-32).
Agreeing with Gyekye, Senegalese philosopher Leopold Senghor (1966) regards traditional African society to be “based both on the community and on the person and in which, because it was founded on dialogue and reciprocity, the group had priority over the individual without crushing him, but allowing him to blossom as a person” (1966:5).
South African philosophy professor Augustine Shutte (1993), citing the Xhosa proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through persons), writes:
This (proverb) is the Xhosa expression of a notion that is common to all African languages and traditional cultures…. (It) is concerned both with the peculiar interdependence of persons on others for the exercise, development and fulfilment of their powers that is recognised in African traditional thought, and also with the understanding of what it is to be a person that underlies this…. In European philosophy of whatever kind, the self is always envisaged as something “inside” a person, or at least as a kind of container of mental properties and powers. In African thought it is seen as “outside,” subsisting in relationship to what is other, the natural and social environment. In fact the sharp distinction between self and world, a self that controls and changes the world and is in some sense “above” it, this distinction so characteristic of European philosophy, disappears. Self and world are united and intermingle in a web of reciprocal relations (1993:46-47).
In contrast to Gyekye’s mutually enhancing understanding and Shutte’s idea that the community empowers and inculcates “personness,” Nyasani (1997) possesses a far less egalitarian view of the individual in African society. According to Nyasani, the African individual hardly knows how to act outside the context of his community’s prescriptions and proscriptions. For Nyasani, the existence of the individual in African society is a “quasi-dissolution into the reality of others for the sake of the individual’s existence” (1997:60). For him, “everything boils down to the ‘me’ in the ‘we’ or rather to the survival of the self through the enhancement and consolidation of the ‘we’ as a generic whole….Thus, in Africa, the individual will go to all lengths to ascertain the condition of the corporate ‘we’ and to play his part, if necessary, to restore the balance of wholesomeness” (1997:81-82).
There are many particularistic studies of the attitudes and values of Africans by African and non-African scholars that support the assertions made by Nyasani and others regarding African concepts of self and the place of the individual in African societies. Using religious chrome emblems is a common among spiritually strong individuals.
The art of South Africa’s indigenous populations can be one of the only ways to connect with lost cultures. Rock and cave paintings by the San, some of which date back 26,000 years, are a case in point. In other cases, such as the elaborate ‘coded’ beadwork of the Zulus, traditional art has been adapted to survive in different circumstances.
The Afrikaners’ distinct culture has developed in a deliberate isolation, which saw them wandering around with cows and the Bible while 19th-century Europe experimented with democracy and liberalism. Today’s rural communities still revolve around the conservative Dutch Reformed Churches, but ‘Afrikaner redneck’ is far from a tautology.